This study replicates Dushnitsky and Shaver (2009) and examines the conditions that facilitate inter-organizational relationships. We consider the role played by legal defenses in encouraging the formation of ties between new ventures and same-industry corporate venture capitalists, and we
INTRODUCTION
Dushnitsky and Shaver (2009) (D&S) examine the conditions under which valuable interorganizational relationships do not materialize. They focus attention on corporate venture capital (CVC) investments -i.e. minority equity investments made by established firms in young privately held ventures (see Dushnitsky, 2012) -and argue that such relationships with incumbents are a double-edged sword for new ventures. On the one hand, new ventures often have access to limited financial and non-financial resources and are attracted by the valuable resources of the parent companies of CVCs (Park and Steensma, 2012) . On the other hand, these ties may be accompanied by a substantial risk that the new venture's knowledge will be misappropriated (Alvarez and Barney, 2001) , i.e., that CVCs will "imitate the innovation [developed by the new venture], and leave the entrepreneur empty-handed" (D&S, p. 1046). Thus, CVCs whose parent company operates in the same industry as the focal new venture (hereafter, same-industry CVCs) are simultaneously the most dangerous and (potentially) the most valuable partners. D&S claim that the propensity of new ventures to partner with same-industry CVCs is moderated by the tightness of the intellectual property protection (IPP) regime in the industry of the new venture. If legal mechanisms such as patents and trade secrets provide new ventures with a high level of IPP -as is the case in industries such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) 1 -new ventures will be more inclined to partner with same-industry CVCs. However, when IPP is of limited effectiveness in the relevant industry, the opposite holds true. 3 Whereas our intention in this study is to replicate the findings of D&S, D&S have left open the question as to how new ventures can form valuable CVC ties in a weak IPP regime and nonetheless protect themselves from knowledge misappropriation. Other studies have further investigated the tension between value creation and value misappropriation in CVC ties, which is also known as the "swimming with the sharks" dilemma (Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt, 2008; Hallen, Katila, and Rosenberger, 2014; Kim, 2014) . These complementary studies argue that in addition to legal defense, new ventures can use timing and social defenses to safeguard their knowledge from misappropriation. First, new ventures can use timing defenses by delaying the establishment of CVC ties (Katila et al., 2008) . Once new ventures have developed a technological artifactsuch as a patent, a prototype, or a productand have begun to build their customer base, it is more difficult for CVCs to misappropriate the venture's knowledge. Second, new ventures can affiliate with prominent independent VCs (IVCs) to engage in social defenses (Hallen et al., 2014) to protect themselves from misappropriation. IVCs that occupy a central position in the VC syndication network are ideally positioned to deter opportunistic behavior by CVCs. First, for CVCs establishing and maintaining ties with central IVCs is valuable because they are desirable future partners (Burt, 2005) . Second, central IVCs can leverage their positions to effectively broadcast alleged misbehavior by CVCs (Raub and Weesie, 1990) .
In this paper, in addition to the legal defenses suggested by D&S, we draw from the contributions of Katila et al. (2008) and Hallen et al. (2014) to examine whether timing and social defenses encourage the formation of same-industry CVC ties. In so doing, our objective is to provide a comprehensive understanding of both the set of mechanisms that new ventures can use to protect their knowledge and the manner in which these mechanisms interact with one another. In particular, Hallen et al. (2014 Hallen et al. ( , p. 1084 claim that social defenses are likely to become especially valuable when legal defenses are not available, which indicates that social defenses act as a 4 substitute for legal defenses. Their argument relies on the assumption that new ventures are sufficiently resourceful to protect their IP rights under a strong IPP regime. However, previous studies show that new ventures are more likely to be involved in patent litigations and may have difficulties in defending their IP rights (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004) . In a strong IPP regime, backing by centrally positioned IVCs can make credible ventures' threat to aggressively pursue IP infringements and therefore play a re-enforcing role in deterring CVCs' opportunistic behavior. In this latter case, social defenses may complement legal defenses rather than acting as a substitute.
Unlike prior studies, which are all based on data from U.S. new ventures, we use a sample of European new ventures. We believe that Europe provides a unique context for the particular sample used in this replication study. As we illustrate in the next section, although the IPP regimes in Europe and the U.S. are of similar strength, European countries feature other institutional characteristics that differ considerably from those in the U.S. (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000) and that deeply affect the functioning of the VC market (e.g., Bruton, Fried, and Manigart, 2005; Armour and Cumming, 2006; Li and Zahra, 2012) . The findings of our study highlight that the institutional setting substantially influences the protection from knowledge misappropriation that legal, timing, and social defenses offer to new ventures and how these defense mechanisms affect the formation of CVC ties (notably, with same-industry CVCs).
Our analysis takes advantage of data provided by a new dataset on VC investments in young high-tech ventures located in Europe: the VICO database. The VICO database was built by the VICO project, which was funded by the European Commission under the 7 th Framework Program (http://www.vicoproject.org/. For a detailed description, see Bertoni and Martì, 2011 ). This database combines information from country-specific proprietary databases and other secondary sources (e.g., VCs' websites), in addition to commercial databases (i.e., Thomson One, VCpro-Database and Zephyr). This approach overcomes the well-known limitations of commercial 5 databases, which provide inadequate coverage of VC investments in Europe and frequently miscategorize VC investor types. 2
THE SETTING OF THE REPLICATION: THE VC MARKET IN EUROPE
Studies of VC that are inspired by institutional theory (North, 1990) have shown that the functioning of the VC market in different countries is deeply influenced by country-specific institutional characteristics related to the organization of the financial system, the entrepreneurfriendliness of the legal environment, and cognitive institutions associated with social culture (e.g., Bruton et al., 2005; Armour and Cumming, 2006; Li and Zahra, 2012) . We compare the institutional environments in Europe and in the U.S. as their similarities and differences have consequential implications for our replication study.
For the objectives of the present study, the most important similarity between Europe and the U.S. involves the IPP regime. The available evidence shows that both the European patent system and the enforcement of IP rights in Europe are as strong as their counterparts in the U.S., with only minor variations across European countries (Ginarte and Park, 1997; Park, 2008) .
Therefore, for European new ventures, the recourse to legal defense mechanisms is likely to be as effective as it is in the U.S.
Although the IPP regimes in the U.S. and Europe are of similar strength, the legal environment in Europe is not as friendly to VC investment as it is in the U.S. In Europe, the level of investor protection is generally lower (La Porta et al., 2000) , bankruptcy law is typically more 2 The studies of U.S. new ventures in the VC literature stream typically use Thomson One, formerly known as VentureXpert, as the source of their data. However, it is common knowledge that Thomson One's coverage of the European VC market is more limited. For example, the total amount of VC investments in European Union countries calculated from Thomson One data in 2005 is equal to approximately 26.7 billion Euros (Oehler et al., 2007 ; assuming a USD/Euro exchange rate of 1.2 in 2005). However, the same measure reported by the European Venture Capital Association in its 2007 report is equal to approximately 47 billion Euros. Moreover, scholars have expressed concerns regarding the accuracy of the CVC classification in Thomson One (Ivanov and Xie, 2010: p. 135 ). In accordance with these concerns, Da Gbadija, Gailly, and Schwienbacher (2014) report that only approximately 55% of the CVC programs of non-U.S. firms they identified by using national directoriesa methodology similar to that used in building the VICO databaseappeared in Thomson One, whereas all U.S. firms that were members of the NVCA were listed as parent companies in Thomson One. 6 protective of lenders to the detriment of equity holders (Armour and Cumming, 2006) , and labor market regulation is more rigid, which negatively impacts early-stage investments (Jeng and Wells, 2000) . Furthermore, stock markets are less developed in Europe than those in the U.S. A less liquid stock market makes it more difficult for VCs to exit successfully through an IPO or a trade sale (Black and Gilson, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000) . Finally, cognitive institutions related to the culture of a society also create a less favorable environment for VC investments in Europe than in the U.S. The major differences include the lower social status of entrepreneurs (Bruton et al., 2005) , a greater tendency to avoid uncertainty and a greater inclination to collectivism as opposed to individualism (Li and Zahra, 2012) . These institutional peculiarities of Europe have important implications for our replication study because they limit the effectiveness of the timing and social defense mechanisms that new ventures can use to mitigate the misappropriation risks inherent in CVC investments.
We argue that timing defenses are ineffective and difficult to deploy in Europe because of a dearth of high-quality early-stage IVCs and other valuable early-stage funding options. Whereas IVCs in the U.S. have historically been active early-stage investors (Ferrary, 2010) , the European institutional setting renders IVCs relatively less inclined to invest in early-stage companies (Bruton et al., 2005) . IVCs' limited appetite for risk has generated an early-stage funding gap, which in turn has paved the way for the establishment of VC firms owned by national or local governmental bodies, so-called governmental VCs. Indeed, governmental VCs are widely diffused in European countries, whereas they are all but non-existent in the U.S. In accordance with their mandate, European governmental VCs concentrate their investments in early-stage companies. However, the available evidence indicates that the impact of these investments on European investee firms has been negligible (Colombo, Cumming, and Vismara, 2014) . These circumstances suggest that timing 7 defenses are difficult for European new ventures to use because the opportunity costs of delaying the formation of ties with CVCs are high. 3 Second, social defense mechanisms associated with backing by relatively more prominent IVCs are also likely to be less effective for European ventures than for U.S. ventures because the VC syndication network is less dense in Europe than in the U.S. As explained above, the institutional characteristics of Europe make it a less attractive setting for VC investments than the U.S., which is shown by the lower value of the VC & PE country attractiveness index (Groh, Liechtenstein, and Lieser, 2010) . In 2009the last year of the period considered in this studythe value of this index was equal to 67.5 in Europe and 100 in the U.S. Accordingly, the European VC market is less developed than the U.S. VC market. In 2009, the ratio of VC investments to GDP in the U.S. was 173 percent, 292 percent and 179 percent higher than the corresponding values in the three largest European VC markets, the UK, Germany, and France, respectively (OECD, 2011) .
Moreover, the European VC market remains fragmented in national sub-markets, partly due to regulatory constraints and double taxation problems that hinder cross-border investment. 4 Therefore, IVCs active in Europe generally occupy a less central position in the VC syndication network than those active in the U.S., which renders them less desirable as future syndication partners and less capable to efficiently broadcast allegations of misconduct by CVCs.
3 Bertoni, Colombo, and Quas (2015) analyze the patterns of investment specialization of different types of VCs in Europe and compare them with those of VCs in the U.S. Comparable data are available on the age of European and U.S. investee ventures. They find that IVCs' share of investments in newly created ventures in Europe (i.e., ventures that are less than one year old) is significantly smaller (-8 percent) than their overall share of total VC investments, whereas this measure is 10 percent greater for IVCs in the U.S. Moreover, governmental VCs' share of investments in European newly created ventures is 45 percent greater than their overall share of VC investments. Finally, in the U.S., CVCs' share of investments in newly created ventures is 25 percent smaller than their share of total VC investments, whereas CVCs in Europe do not exhibit any significant tendency to refrain from investing in this type of venture. In a similar vein, Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, (2004) shows that in Europe, early-stage CVC investments are more frequent than in the U.S.
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In sum, considering the institutional characteristics of Europe, we expect European new ventures to rank defense mechanisms differently from their U.S. peers and to regard legal, social, and timing defenses as effective, partially effective, and ineffective defense mechanisms, respectively. Moreover, the institutional peculiarities of Europe may also influence the extent to which legal and social defenses are regarded by European new ventures as substitutes for or complements to one another. It may be presumed that social defenses used in isolation in Europe do not provide adequate protection from dangerous sharks. Nevertheless, they may reinforce the protection offered by legal defenses, as under a strong IPP regime, new ventures backed by relatively more central IVCs can aggressively pursue IP infringements by CVCs. Data on VC-backed ventures were then crosschecked with information publicly available from the ventures' websites, press releases, initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses (for firms that went through an IPO), and the annual reports and websites of VC firms. A central unit coordinated the data collection process and assured the consistency of data across countries. To be included in the final sample, VC-backed ventures had to comply with the following criteria. First, all VC-backed ventures had to receive their first round of VC between 1994 and 2004. Second, the ventures must have been less than ten years old at the time of the first VC round. Third, the ventures also had to be independent at their foundation. Fourth, as is customary in the VC literature, the VICO database excludes late stage investments (e.g., leveraged buyouts, real estate, distressed buyouts, and other private equity investments). Notably, the database includes both surviving and non-surviving firms, which alleviates possible concerns regarding survivorship bias. By the end of the observation period, sample firms may have gone through an IPO, may have remained privately held and independent, may have been acquired (thereby losing their independence), may have gone bankrupt, or may have otherwise terminated operations. Altogether, the VICO database includes data on 759 VC-backed ventures. VICO provides information on the VC investment rounds for these ventures between 1994 and 2009, including the year of the round, the investment amount and the identity of all VCs. In addition, it provides information on the sectors of operation of the ventures, their addresses and patenting data from the European Patent Office. For most ventures, it also provides longitudinal accounting data insourced from the Bureau Van Dijk Amadeus database. Furthermore, we double-checked the identity of all CVCs, their locations and legal status (i.e., whether the CVC program is a wholly owned subsidiary), and we collected additional sales data, industries of operation of parent companies (both from Orbis, Amadeus, and Compustat databases), and geographic coordinates (from Google Maps API Web Services) related to parent companies. 10 After excluding observations with missing data, our analysis considers 658 ventures that received 1,577 VC rounds during the period 1994-2009. Of these ventures, 98 received VC from 75 unique CVCs. CVCs participated in 137 out of the 1,577 VC rounds (i.e., 8.7 percent). The number of total CVC investments is equal to 155 because in some rounds ventures received more than one CVC investment.
METHODS

Data and Sample
Measures
Dependent variable
In order to explore with whom new ventures form relationships, we perform a dyad-level analysis.
This analysis allows us to investigate factors that drive new ventures' partner-selection decisions.
Since the unit of analysis is the dyad between a CVC investor and a venture at each round, we consider all possible combinations between each venture at a given round of funding and each unique CVC investor. Our sample encompasses 121,261 possible dyads (1,577 venture-rounds × 91 CVCs, 6 minus 22,246 observations with missing information on sales of CVCs' parent company).
The dependent variable Realizedij takes the value of one if CVC i invested in venture j at a given round and zero otherwise. There are 155 realized investments versus a counterfactual of 121,106 non-realized investments. D&S consider only the initial round of investment. To replicate D&S, we initially focus attention on the first round of investment. In this case, our sample encompasses 47,708 dyads (658 ventures × 91 CVCs, minus 12,170 observations with missing information on sales of CVCs' parent company).
Independent variables
Industry Overlap. We measure industry overlap between the parent companies of CVCs and the sample ventures based on the three-digit (i.e., group-level) NACE rev. 2 industry classification codes. 7 Industry Overlap is a dummy variable that is set to one if in the focal dyad, there is a match between any of the venture's industry codes and any of the codes of the CVC's parent company; otherwise, it is set to zero.
IPP regime. We follow D&S in defining the strength of the IPP regime and set IPP regime to one if ventures operate in industries in which legal defenses of IP are relatively more effective. These industries include pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, biological products, chemical products, surgical instruments, and other medical equipment. If ventures operate in any of the remaining industries under consideration, IPP regime is equal to zero. In this paper, we do not distinguish between patent and secrecy mechanisms as Katila et al. (2008) do. Previous studies argue that new ventures tend to use these mechanisms in combination (James, Leiblen, and Lu, 2013) . To check whether one single variable is sufficient to capture the protection offered to new ventures by patent and secrecy mechanisms, we use survey data collected at the University of Cambridge relating to U.S. and U.K. manufacturing and business services firms (Cosh, Hughes, and Lester, 2006) . This survey extends the Carnegie Mellon Survey (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) to business services and provides separate data for small firms (i.e., firms with fewer than 250 employees) and large firms.
We consider the average score assigned by small firms to the effectiveness of the following means for protecting innovation: design registration, trademarks, patents, copyright, confidentiality agreements, and secrecy. We perform several analyses. First, we calculate the correlation between the scores of patents and secrecy across the twenty-five industries considered in the survey. The correlation is positive, very high (0.69) and significant (p<0.01). Second, the Cronbach's alpha for 12 the above list of protection mechanisms is 0.76 (p<0.01), which indicates that all mechanisms are measuring the same protection construct. Third, we perform an explanatory factor analysis on this list of protection mechanisms, which shows that only one factor has an eigenvalue above one and that all the protection mechanisms load onto this single factor. This factor explains approximately 88 percent of the variance. Fourth, we group secrecy and confidentiality agreements into one variable by taking their maximum in each industry; we also group the rest of the protection mechanisms and take their maximum in each industry. The correlation between these two variables is also high (0.76; p<0.01).
VC centrality.
To measure social defense provided by existing VCs, we follow Hallen et al. (2014) and consider whether new ventures are backed by well-connected VCs. More precisely, we consider the eigenvector centrality, which captures the status of existing VCs and their ability to broadcast information about alleged misconduct by CVCs. We operationalize VC centrality in the same manner as Hallen et al. (2014) . First, we create an adjacency matrix A=[aij], which represents the VCs that are adjacent to (i.e., have syndicated with) other VCs in the prior five years as recorded in the Thomson One database. Therefore, aij is set to one if VCi and VCj co-invest in a given venture in the prior five years and zero otherwise. Next, we calculate the eigenvector that corresponds to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A. The eigenvector centrality for a VC is a recursive measure, assigning a higher score to a VC that has syndicated with VCs who have higher centrality scores (Bonacich, 1987) . We then scale the measure by the maximum obtained in each year to allow for comparability across years (our results are robust to this normalization). Finally, we define VC centrality at each round as the maximum scaled eigenvector centrality of all the participating VCs up to the focal round in the new venture. 8
Round. We use the ordinal count (1st, 2nd, etc.) of the current financing round in the focal venture.
Each subsequent round reflects the achievement of a milestone by the venture, closely following its development over time. Katila et al. (2008) use this variable as a proxy for timing defenses; in later rounds, ventures reportedly are better able to protect their technological knowledge from misappropriation by CVCs.
Control variables
We consider several control variables that might influence the likelihood of forming relationships with CVCs. We include in the model specification all controls considered by D&S. We also consider several additional control variables taking inspiration from studies in the swimming with sharks literature. Following D&S, we expect CVCs that belong to larger parent companies to be more attractive to new ventures, and we thus control for parent company's relative size. CVC size is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the sales of the parent company of the focal CVC investor to the average sales of all firms in the industry (defined at NACE Rev. 2 three digit, data were obtained from the Amadeus and Orbis databases) in the year of the investment round. Subsidiary equals one if the CVC program is a wholly owned subsidiary and zero otherwise. New ventures' fear of misappropriation is less pronounced when the CVC investment is made through a dedicated subsidiary. We control for investor preferences with respect to venture industry (Industry no preference). To construct this variable, we consult the membership directory of the European private equity & venture capital association (EVCA), and the websites of CVC investors, and complement this information with operating industries of the parent companies. The variable Industry no preference takes the value of one if an investor in not interested in a given venture's industry of operation because it doesn't seek investments in the venture's industry, and zero otherwise. To capture the visibility and attractiveness of the CVCs, we measure their normalized the use of the maximum score of centrality up to the focal round, as suggested by Hallen et al. (2014) , alleviates concerns about the quality of this measure. eigenvector centrality (CVC centrality). Prior CVC investors is a dummy variable with a value set to one if the focal venture received CVC investment in any prior round and zero otherwise. This variable controls for path dependencies in CVC tie formation. Venture age measures the years elapsed since the foundation of the focal venture up to the VC round under consideration. To control for the quality of ventures' technological assets, we use the ventures' citation-weighted patent stock (Citation-weighted patent stock). To this end, we proceed as follows. We measure the number of annual successful (i.e., granted) patent applications of each venture in the European Patent Office, dated at the application year. To capture their economic importance, we weight each successful patent application by their forward citations five years subsequent to filing and then use a 15 percent knowledge-depreciation rate (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005) . To control for the quality of ventures, we track the exit outcomes of ventures up to 2009. We set Venture quality to one if the focal venture went through a successful exit (i.e., either an IPO or an acquisition) and to zero otherwise. 9 Because the probability of forming ties decreases as the distance between investors and target ventures increases (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) , we include Distance in the set of controls. This variable measures the geographical distance (in thousands of kilometers) between the focal venture and the headquarters of the CVC investor's parent company. CVC to IVC inflow is calculated as the ratio of annual CVC inflow to the annual IVC inflow in each country-year to control for the relative supply of CVC versus IVC in each country-year. Finally, previous studies (e.g., Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellman, 2011) have shown that country-level bilateral trust influences VC flows across countries. To control for Trust, which measures the extent to which people from one nation express attitudes of trustworthiness to people from another nation (or their own nation), we use the trust-related question in the Eurobarometer survey from 1996. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of all variables. The mean of realized CVC investments is 0.001 (i.e., the ratio of 155 realized CVC investments to the 121,261 possible investments). Ventures operate in the same industry as the CVC's parent company in 11 percent of all dyads. 11.8 percent of all dyads involve a venture that operates in an industry with a strong IPP regime. The fact that the mean value of VC centrality in our sample (i.e., 0.07) is much lower than the corresponding value in Hallen et al. (2014) is consistent with our contention that the syndication network of VCs in Europe is less dense than the corresponding network in the U.S.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Approximately 31.6 (29.5) percent of the venture rounds (ventures) experience a successful exit, which is close to the 36.3 percent in D&S. The correlations between variables are low, with the exception of the positive correlation between Venture age and Round (0.384, p<0.01), and CVC size and Subsidiary (0.526, p<0.01). Regarding concerns about multicollinearity, we enter these variables both separately and simultaneously, and the results do not change. Moreover, we estimate standard OLS models and compute variance inflation factors and condition indices. None of these values is close to the cutoffs of 10 and 50 that are associated with multicollinearity concerns (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 2005) .
Insert Table 1 around here
As a preliminary step, to replicate D&S we focus on the first round of investment. Table 2 presents a univariate analysis of the proportion of same-industry dyads within realized and unrealized investments contingent on the strength of the IPP regime in the first round of investment. Table 2 in D&S. Under a strong IPP regime, realized investments between same-industry pairs constitute a greater share of total realized investments (66.7%) than the corresponding share for unrealized investments (7.3%). The difference is statistically significant 16 (Wilcoxon z-stat = 18.46, p<0.01). Under a weak IPP regime, investments between same-industry pairs are again more frequent among realized than unrealized investments (26.0% compared with 11.7%; Wilcoxon z-stat = 71.15, p<0.01). The univariate results under a strong IPP regime are similar to those of D&S, although the results diverge under a weak regime. Furthermore, the share of realized investments between same-industry pairs out of total realized investments is much larger under a strong IPP regime than under a weak IPP regime. These results point to a possible positive interaction effect between Industry overlap and IPP regime in explaining the formation of ties with CVCs.
This table reproduces
Insert Tables 2 and 3 around here
To conduct a multivariate dyad-level analysis and estimate the likelihood that a focal venture receives financing from a unique CVC investor in the first round of investment, we employ a logit model. Consistent with D&S, we resort to a cross-sectional analysis and cluster standard errors at the venture level to control for the non-independence of observations related to the same venture. We reproduce Table 3 of D&S using an identical specification. Table 3 presents the estimates for a strong IPP regime in Model I and weak IPP regime in Model II. 10 The coefficient of Industry overlap in both IPP regimes is positive and significant. The pattern of investment formation of our sample in a strong IPP regime is similar to D&S; however, it diverges for a weak IPP regime. The column to the right of each model reports the marginal effects of Industry overlap, while other variables are held at their mean. Under a strong IPP regime and holding all other variables at their mean, the probability of a realized investment increase from 0.0260 percent when the pair is operating in different industries to 0.5990 percent when the products of the two are 10 Another option is to abstain from splitting the sample and to insert the two dummy variables Industry overlap and IPP regime and their interaction term into the model specification; in Table 4a , we present the results of such estimates. The evidence is consistent with the results illustrated in this section. Note also that this latter specification is fully equivalent to creating four mutually exclusive categories: Industry overlap & strong IPP regime, Industry overlap & weak IPP regime, No industry overlap & strong IPP regime, and No industry overlap & weak IPP regime. potential substitutes (i.e., increases by 0.0057). Given that the mean value of the dependent variable is equal to 0.1 percent, the magnitude of the effect of Industry overlap is very large, consistent with D&S. Contrary to D&S, within the subsample of weak IPP regime, there is an increase in the probability of tie formation from 0.0590 percent for different-industry pairs to 0.2223 percent for same-industry pairs (i.e., an increase by 0.0016), if we hold all other variables at their mean.
However, in line with D&S's results, the increase in a weak IPP regime is substantially smaller than the one detected under a strong IPP regime.
We perform additional analysis to test whether the positive and significant coefficients of Industry overlap in the two IPP regimes are statistically different from each other. Comparison of these coefficients suggests that the marginal effect of Industry overlap when the IPP regime is strong is larger than its effect when the IPP regime is weak. However, such comparison of the coefficients across groups is only meaningful if the samples in each group are of roughly the same size (Hoetker, 2007) . In our case, the number of observations in the strong IPP regime is much smaller than the number in the weak IPP regime, which is therefore likely to violate the assumption of equal residual variationan assumption that is necessary for a naïve comparison of coefficients across groups in a logit analysis. Therefore, we followed Hoetker's (2007) suggestion and performed Allison's (1999) test, which rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of Industry overlap are the same across IPP regimes (likelihood ratio χ 2 (1)= 10.23, p<0.01). We postpone explanation of control variables until the next set of analyses.
Additional dyad-level analysis
We complement the dyad-level analysis of D&S by inserting in the model specification the Round and VC centrality variables, as suggested by Katila et al. (2008) and Hallen et al. (2014) as proxies for timing and social defenses as well as other control variables. This set of analysis requires us to extend the analysis to all the investment rounds. Table 4a reports the results of the estimates, 18 whereas Table 4b presents the average marginal effects 11 of Industry overlap contingent on the value of the defense variables. Model I presents the baseline regression. We first briefly consider the effect of control variables. Younger ventures are more likely to receive a CVC investment; the coefficient of Venture age is negative and significant (p<0.05). Citation-weighted patent stock and Venture quality have statistically non-significantalthough positiveeffects on the likelihood of tie formation. The coefficient of Distance is also non-significant. The lack of significance may suggest that CVCs are willing to invest across European geographic markets and are not discouraged by geographically distant targets (Ernst & Young, 2002) . CVCs that occupy a central position in VC syndication networks and those with their CVC program structured as subsidiary appear to be more attractive partners for new ventures, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of CVC centrality and Subsidiary (respectively, p<0.01 and, p<0.05). The coefficient of Industry no preference is not statistically significant. The coefficient of Prior corporate investors again is positive and significant (p<0.01), which indicates that ventures are path-dependent in forming ties with CVCs. The coefficients of CVC size and CVC to IVC inflow although positive, are not statistically significant. Lastly, the coefficient of Trust is positive and significant (p<0.01) and
indicates that new ventures are more inclined to form ties with CVCs located in countries they trust.
Insert Tables 4 around here
Let us now turn to Industry overlap. Its coefficient is positive and significant (p<0.01), and its average marginal effect is 0.00166 (p<0.01). Holding all remaining variables at their mean values, the probability of forming a CVC tie increases by 271 percent when Industry overlap is switched from zero to one. This result suggests that same-industry CVCs can offer European new ventures access to more valuable resources than different-industry investors and are thus regarded as more attractive partners in spite of the greater misappropriation risks these ties may generate.
Next, we investigate the effects of variables that proxy legal, social, and timing defense mechanisms. In Model I, neither the coefficient of IPP regime nor that of VC centrality are statistically significant, albeit positive. The coefficient of Round is also non-significant but negative, which doesn't support the argument that new ventures time CVC investments to coincide with later funding rounds in order to protect their knowledge. In order to get further insights into this issue, in Model II we include the squared term of Round to test whether this variable has a curvilinear association with the probability of CVC tie formation. In Model II, the coefficient of Round is negative, and its squared term is positive (both significant with p<0.01), which suggests a U-shaped relationship. The average marginal effect of Round is negative up to the fourth round and turns positive from the fifth round onwards. We also follow the simulation-based approach recommended by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) to test for the curvilinear effect. First, based on the estimates of Model II, we draw one value of the coefficient vector from the multivariate normal distribution with means equal to the point estimates of the coefficients and variance matrix equal to the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the coefficient estimates. Second, we set the values of all explanatory variables except Round at their means and calculate the expected values of the probability of CVC tie formation when Round is set at different values from the first Round to the tenth Round. Third, we calculate first-differences, that is, the difference between the expected probability of CVC tie formation at two subsequent rounds, at different values of Round (i.e., pr(Y=1 | Round=r+1) -pr(Y=1 | Round=r), for r=1, …, 9). Fourth, we repeat the above algorithm 1,000 times to approximate the distributions of first-differences and calculate 95% confidence intervals. The results (reported in Appendix B, Figure B1 , available on line) confirm that the effect of Round is U-shaped. The first-difference is negative and significant at early rounds (up to Round=3) and becomes positive and significant at later rounds (from Round=8). For comparison 20 purposes, we perform the same exercise based on the estimates of Model I and report the results in Appendix B, Figure B2 .
To shed further light on whether legal, timing, and social defenses facilitate swimming with more dangerous "sharks" (i.e., same-industry CVCs), we interact Industry overlap with IPP regime in Model III, Round and Round squared in Model IV, and VC centrality in Model V, respectively.
Consistent with D&S, we find again that same-industry pairs are more likely to form ties under a strong IPP regime than under a weak regime. The interaction term in Model III is positive and significant (p<0.05). The coefficients of the interactions of Industry overlap, and Round and Round squared in Model IV are jointly significant (p<0.1). However, as clarified below with the presentation of marginal effects, these estimates do not appear to indicate that European new ventures abstain from forming same-industry CVC ties in early rounds. The coefficient of the interaction of Industry overlap and VC centrality in Model V is not statistically significant, albeit positive. Lastly, in Model VI we add a three-way interaction term between Industry overlap, IPP regime, and VC centrality. The null hypothesis that in this model, the interaction terms are not different from zero is rejected by a Wald χ 2 test (χ 2 (4)= 21.63, p<0.01). To better interpret these results, let us consider the average marginal effects reported in Table 4b . Panel A shows that the average marginal effect of Industry overlap under a strong IPP regime is equal to 0.0097 (p<0.1), while it is equal to 0.0019 (p<0.1) under a weak IPP regime. Holding all remaining variables at their mean, if a new venture is protected by a strong IPP regime, the estimated likelihood of forming a tie with same-industry CVCs is more than ten times higher (+1,204 percent) than the likelihood of forming a tie with a different-industry CVC investor. Under a weak IPP regime, the corresponding increase in the likelihood of tie formation is substantially smaller (+191 percent). Under a strong IPP regime and with VC centrality set at one standard deviation above the mean, a switch of Industry overlap from zero to one increases the likelihood of tie formation by 0.0161 (p<0.05), corresponding to a large percentage increase (+4,078 percent). The extent of this effect rapidly declines with decreasing values of VC centrality. For example, with VC centrality set to the minimum value, the marginal effect of Industry overlap is equal to just 0.0039 and is not significant at conventional confidence levels. By contrast, under a weak IPP regime, we are unable to detect any substantial increase in the marginal effect of Industry overlap associated with an increase of VC centrality. To have a more immediate understanding of the effect of VC centrality on the likelihood of forming CVC ties, we plot the likelihood of tie formation in Figure 1 as a function of VC centrality, IPP regime, and Industry overlap. The graph shows that if we consider a same-industry pair under a strong IPP regime, VC centrality clearly has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of tie formation. This effect vanishes if Industry overlap is equal to zero and/or the IPP regime is weak. We also cross-checked these results through the simulation procedure proposed by King et al.
(2000) and described earlier. We calculate the increase in the simulated expected probability of 22 CVC tie formation when Industry overlap switches from 0 to 1 at different values of IPP regime and VC centrality. The results that are reported in Table B1 of Appendix B appear consistent with those illustrated above. In particular, in a strong IPP regime an increase of Industry overlap from zero to one generates an increase in the simulated expected probability of CVC tie formation that is larger as the value of VC centrality increases. The 95% confidence intervals of the simulated distributions of the differences in first-differences are above 0 for a change of VC centrality both from the minimum to the mean and from the mean to a value equal to one standard deviation above the mean. Altogether, our findings suggest that VC centrality in Europe reinforces legal defenses, and both complement each other to increase the likelihood of formation of same-industry CVC ties.
Robustness checks and alternative explanations
We performed several robustness checks, and the results are reported in Appendix A, Table A1 . 12 First, we included Round size in Model I, as we checked whether the size of ventures' financial needs is a source of omitted variable bias. In later rounds, ventures require greater capital infusion, and inside investors typically do not provide all the financing for a focal venture across rounds.
Although we have data on round size only in approximately two-thirds of the observations, the inclusion of this variable does not change the results, suggesting that omitted variable bias is negligible in our estimates in spite of our reduced sample size. Second, we performed conditional logit regressions with grouping on new ventures. This specification allows us to control for latent venture characteristics. Following this approach, variables such as Venture quality that do not vary across observations relating to a focal venture, are dropped. In addition, ventures that are never backed by any CVCs drop out because the dependent variable does not vary across such ventures.
Despite a lower sample size, Model II shows similar results to those illustrated earlier. Third, to check whether CVC investor fixed effects drive our results, we repeated the logit analysis while clustering standard errors by CVCs rather than by new ventures (Model III). Clustering on CVCs implies that dyadic observations are independent across investors but not necessarily independent within investors. In addition, we used a conditional logit model grouping on CVCs to control for latent investor characteristics (Model IV), and the results remain unchanged. Fourth, our dependent variable characterizes a rare event because realized investments are about one thousand times fewer than unrealized investments (King and Zeng, 2001) . When working with rare events data, fitting the logit model is likely to underestimate the probability of realized events (i.e., Pr(Y=1)) and overestimate the probability of unrealized events (i.e., Pr(Y=0)). To correct for the possible positive bias in the direction of unrealized investments, we estimate a rare event logit model ("relogit" in Stata) . The estimates of the coefficients remain almost unchanged, suggesting that the size of the bias is negligible in our study.
We also explored alternative explanations to our findings. Thus far in this replication study, we have followed Katila et al. (2008) and Hallen et al. (2014) (Stuart et al., 1999; Hsu, 2004) , thereby attracting CVCs. Second, an increase in the probability of CVC tie formation in later rounds may reflect CVCs' inclination to refrain from investing in high-risk
ventures. 13
It may be wondered whether the endorsement effect associated with VC centrality may explain our results. Indeed, Hallen et al. (2014) note that a positive interaction of VC centrality with other defenses may indicate an endorsement effect; these authors find a negative interaction and rule out this alternative explanation. In our sample of European ventures, we find that there is a positive interaction of VC centrality and IPP regime in favoring the formation of same-industry CVC ties. Therefore, we performed several additional analyses to exclude the competing endorsement effect explanation. These analyses are based on the view that if the positive effect of VC centrality on CVC tie formation is driven by an endorsement effect, this effect should be stronger in situations in which information asymmetries are likely to be more severe (Connelly et al., 2011) . Accordingly, we would expect the endorsement effect of VC centrality to be stronger when Industry overlap equals zero because information asymmetries are greater when ventures and CVCs operate in different industries and thus have dissimilar knowledge bases (e.g., Reuer and Ragozzino, 2012) . In the estimates of Model V in Table 4a , we do not find empirical support for this contention. In addition, when ventures proceed through multiple rounds of funding, more information about their potential is revealed to investors (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013) . As the extent of the information asymmetries with CVCs are reduced, the endorsement effect of VC centrality is weakened. Thus, a negative interaction between VC centrality and Round should be expected.
However, the interaction terms between VC centrality and Round (and Round squared) are not significant (estimates are reported in Appendix B, Table B2 , Models I and II). Moreover, the above argument should especially apply to ties with (allegedly less informed) CVCs from different industries. Hence, we inserted the three-way interaction term between VC centrality, Round and Industry overlap (Table B2, Finally, for a subset of the observations in our sample (100,823 out of 121,261 observations), we also have information on ventures' stage of development. Of these, 22 percent of the sample observations are in the seed stage. Ventures in the seed stage are characterized by greater 25 technological and market uncertainty, leading to greater information asymmetries. We then inserted the dummy variable Seed stage into the model specification and interacted it with VC centrality (Appendix B, Table B3a , Model III). We also added the three-way interaction between VC centrality, Seed stage, and Industry overlap (Table B3a , Model IV. See also Fig. B3 ) and calculated the average marginal effect of VC centrality corresponding to different values of Seed stage and Industry overlap (Table B3b ). We detected no evidence of a positive interaction between Seed stage and VC centrality favoring the formation of either same-industry or different-industry CVC ties. In sum, the additional analyses illustrated above do not support the alternative explanation that our findings are driven by an endorsement effect associated with VC centrality.
Our findings relating to the effects of Round on the probability of the formation of CVC ties (particularly same-industry CVC ties) are consistent with the argument that European new ventures do not use timing defenses to safeguard their knowledge. However, our findings are also consistent with the alternative explanation that the scarcity of high quality early-stage VC in Europe forces CVCs to invest in earlier rounds than CVCs in the U.S., in spite of the natural inclination of these investors to wait for technological uncertainty to disappear. Indeed, this inclination may also drive the positive effects of Round on the probability of CVC tie formation in the U.S., as highlighted by Katila et al. (2008) . Our data do not permit an assessment of the relative explanatory power of these two explanations. However, we can check whether the greater technological uncertainty that surrounds ventures' operations in the seed stage deters CVCs. Notably, neither the coefficient of Seed stage nor that of the interaction term between Seed stage and Industry overlap are significant (Appendix B, Table B3a , Model I and II). In addition, the effect of Round on the probability of CVC tie formation remains unchanged after we include Seed stage in the model specification.
Altogether, in our sample of European new ventures we fail to detect any inclination of (same-26 industry or different-industry) CVCs not to invest in the seed stage, even after controlling for their tendency to come on board in earlier rounds.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to replicate the findings of D&S as they relate to the role of legal defenses in favoring the formation of ties with same-industry CVCs. We also extend this line of inquiry to the consideration of timing and social defenses, as suggested by the "swimming with sharks" literature. Our replication focuses on a different institutional setting than is investigated by previous studies because we examine European new ventures rather than U.S. new ventures.
Whereas some of our results reproduce those found for U.S. ventures, we also find remarkable differences. In Europe, the level of legal protection for IP is similar to that in the U.S. (Ginarte and Park, 1997; Park, 2008) . Accordingly, consistent with the results of D&S, European new ventures are more likely to form ties with same-industry CVCs -viewed as the most valuable and the most dangerous partners -under a strong IPP regime rather than under a weak regime.
Our study detects substantial differences with respect to social and timing defenses compared with previous findings related to U.S. ventures. These differences can be traced to institutional characteristics that make the European VC market different from the U.S. VC market.
Our findings suggest that the likelihood of CVC tie formation in Europe is highest in the first round, decreases leading up to the fourth round, and then increases in subsequent rounds. This pattern holds true independently of whether CVCs operate in the same industry as the investee ventures or in a different industry. In Europe, IVCs are less inclined to engage in early-stage investments than they are in the U.S. (Bruton et al., 2005 , Bertoni et al., 2015 , and governmental VCs, which do invest in early-stage ventures, offer new ventures limited added value (Colombo et al., 2014) . As the set of valuable early-stage financing options for European new ventures is limited, the 27 opportunity costs of timing defenses are much higher than in the U.S. 14 This may make European new ventures less inclined to resort to timing defenses to mitigate the knowledge misappropriation risks that are inherent in CVC ties. Simultaneously, the dearth of high-quality early-stage VCs in Europe is also likely to induce CVCs to invest in earlier rounds than in the U.S. The institutional characteristics of Europe also help explain the difference between our findings relating to the effect of VC centrality and those of previous studies based on U.S. ventures. The European VC market is less developed and more fragmented than the VC market in the U.S. and the syndication network of VCs in Europe is less dense than in the U.S. As a consequence, affiliation with a relatively more prominent VC does not offer European new ventures the same level of social protection against dangerous "sharks" as it does in the U.S. In accordance with this view, European new ventures do not use social defenses in isolation. Instead, we find that these defenses are used as a complement to legal defenses perhaps because ventures backed by prominent IVCs use the threat of aggressive pursuit of IP infringements in a strong IPP regime to deter misconduct by CVCs.
Our findings contribute to the "swimming with sharks" literature by showing the crucial role played by the institutional setting in which new ventures are embedded in influencing the drivers of tie formation with incumbent firms. This contribution is important because all the previous studies in this stream have focused on U.S. ventures and used a theoretical lens that does not include institutional theory. Our findings are in line with the perspective that the level of protection offered by different defenses and the use that new ventures make of these defenses depend on the institutional characteristics of the country in which new ventures are located (see, e.g., Oxley 1999 for a similar approach that relates to IPP and alliance formation). Our study also contributes to the stream of the literature on VC that engages institutional theory (e.g., Bruton et al., 2005; Li and Zahra 2012; Nahata, Hazarika, and Tandon, 2014) . Most previous studies in this stream focus on
IVCs. An exception is Da Gbadji et al. (2014) , who examine the association between the institutional characteristics of countries and the establishment of CVC programs. Our study takes the analysis a step further by showing that institutional characteristics influence the set of protection mechanisms available to new ventures located in a given country, making them more or less inclined to form ties with valuable, but dangerous CVCs.
Our study has certain limitations that also open interesting directions for future research.
First, our counterfactuals come from prior research that employs data on U.S. ventures that are similar to the European ventures examined here except for their location. An ideal sample would contain both U.S. and European observations, which would enable the direct testing of statistical differences. Second, as discussed above, we follow previous studies in using Round and VC centrality as proxies for timing and social defenses, although these two variables might also capture other effects. VC centrality may signal ventures' high quality, which might attract CVCs. Although we did not find any evidence supporting this view in our analysis, this issue deserves additional inquiry in future studies. Moreover, as noted above, we cannot rule out that the greater probability of the formation of CVC ties in early rounds that we detected among European ventures partly reflects the greater inclination of CVCs to make risky investments in Europe (i.e., a supply effect) and not only the lesser inclination of European ventures to resort to timing defenses (i.e., a demand effect). Future research can deepen our understanding of this issue, perhaps by using survey-based measures, following the footsteps of well-established research on the appropriation of innovation value (Cohen et al., 2001) . Third, our study uses data on seven European countries. Future research would benefit from extending this analysis to a larger set of countries with different institutional characteristics (see Nahata et al., 2014 for an example). In particular, it would be interesting to investigate how new ventures located in countries with weak IPP protection manage to "swim with sharks." Fourth, our study explores partner selection decisions in light of the available defense 29 mechanisms but does not examine the performance impact associated with the use of these defenses. The limited available evidence suggests that ties with same-industry CVCs -the most dangerous "sharks" -are those that are particularly beneficial to new ventures (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) . It would be interesting to analyze how defense mechanisms moderate this positive effect. Conversely, the use of certain defenses may hamper future performance. For instance, if a new venture uses a timing defense and delays forming ties with CVCs, it may suffer from a lack of timely access to critical resources that can potentially provide a lead-time advantage. Future studies that link the ability of new ventures to protect their knowledge, the heterogeneity of partners in terms of misappropriation risks and performance outcomes for new ventures will contribute to a deeper understanding of entrepreneurs' decisions to "swim with sharks." Fifth, due to data limitations, we were unable to examine other corporate characteristics that make CVCs more or less dangerous. For instance, Kim (2014) finds that CVCs with a reputation for integrity are less dangerous. Following Diestre and Rajagopalan (2012), future studies that examine different sources of heterogeneity in terms of the capabilities of incumbent firms to misappropriate new ventures' knowledge and their incentives to do so will further illuminate the drivers of tie formation.
Finally, our empirical results also have interesting managerial implications for entrepreneurs. Non-U.S. new ventures may be pushed into forming ties with CVCs in earlier rounds due to the lack of adequate risk capital from IVCs. Entrepreneurs that are wary of the misappropriation risks inherent in CVC ties must carefully consider the institutional characteristics of the countries in which their ventures are located because these characteristics make different defenses more or less effective. For example, European entrepreneurs can leverage the protection afforded by IP laws. Our findings suggest that legal defenses are particularly effective when new ventures are affiliated with prominent IVCs that provide them with the legal and financial assistance to commit to aggressive IP protection strategies. 
6
Confidence intervals at 95% are presented in rectangular bars. Figure B1 . First-difference in the simulated expected probability of CVC tie formation generated by one unit increase of Round based on Model II of Table 4a Figure B2. First-difference in the simulated expected probability of CVC tie formation generated by one unit increase of Round based on Model I of Table 4a Figure B3. VC centrality and the probability of CVC tie formation: the moderating effect of Seed-stage and Industry overlap
